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Hope and Responsibility in Clinical Settings:
Two Reflections on Jewish Life and Death
Ethical Issues in Vulnerable
Persons Research
Deborah Konia-Griffin, PhD
Adeline Nyamathi, PhD
UCLA School of Nursing
"Too Risky for Research? Human Research with
Vulnerable Persons"
Wednesday, October 10, 2001
Presenters
Dr. Deborah Koniak-Griffin &
Dr. Adeline Nyamathi

The UCLA School of Nursing Center for Vulnerable
Populations Research was established at UCLA in 1999. It
has been funded by the National Institute of Nursing
Research over the last five years as an interdisciplinary center. Immunologists are involved, as well as a biological
researcher, behavioral researcher, and a number of professionals in public health. As our boundaries extend, we are
offering a number of programs in different settings, community settings and other universities. At UCLA, we hold a
monthly colloquium, including training workshops and consultation to faculty and students. For nursing there is an
Please turn to page 2

Are Scientific Truths the Only
Truths?
James Walters
Loma Linda University
A few years ago, I wrote up a case in which a 17-year-old
Orthodox Jewish girl was diagnosed with a vaginal carcinoma.
The only hope of curing her disease was to remove her vagina
and uterus and then to treat her with both chemotherapy and
radiation therapy. The treatment would leave her infertile.
When the doctors informed her father of this, he was emotionally devastated by the diagnosis and the proposed treatment.
He thought his daughter would be as well. Therefore, he asked
the doctors not to inform his daughter that she would be sterile
as a result of her treatment. He begged the doctors to withhold
this difficult truth, and perform the operation with a consent
from her that was clearly not informed consent.
His rationale was straightforward. He argued that she would
tolerate the treatment much better if she had hope of a good
outcome. Once she was treated and had recovered, he said,
then the bitter news about infertility could be presented to her
as a consequence of treatment. Furthermore, he argued,
according to Jewish law, patients do not have autonomy as it is
generally understood by secular bioethics. Lifesaving treatPlease turn to page 4

Physician Assisted Suicide continued…
ongoing pre- and post-doctoral trainingship in vulnerable
populations. A variety of field experiences are offered for the
pre- and post-doctoral students. We also have an annual
research conference, which will be held in April 2002 in Palm
Springs. One of our more recent activities is becoming
involved with HIV Vaccine preparedness.
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Four aims of the center
The major aim of the center is to advance knowledge
about health related problems of vulnerable populations, by
supporting ongoing research and new pilot feasibility studies
designed to improve health status outreach for vulnerable
populations. Each year we fund a minimum of three studies.
These are pilot feasibility studies aimed at helping UCLA
faculty develop research programs. Our budget from the government includes money that is designated just for this purpose.
Another aim of the center is to strengthen the resources
for and the utilization of molecular, cellular, and physiologic
assays in studies of the risk and health status of vulnerable
populations. We have correlated in a bio-laboratory core that
provides consultation to people who may be doing some
behavioral research and are interested in biomarkers to be
used in their research with vulnerable populations. We do
the opposite in helping researchers learn some of the behavioral approaches as well. We also have the capacity to do
some assays in our laboratory as well and give priority to our
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pilot studies in terms of usage of resources.
A third aim is to enhance research support, particularly the
development of supportive community networks in all
phases of research with vulnerable populations. For example, we may help connect a researcher with a community that
might become involved in any phase of the research. We are
very committed to involving the communities from the very
beginning phases. They actually help plan and design the
research so that they are partners. We don’t just go into a
community, complete a study, leave and give nothing back.
A final role is to create mechanisms for interdisciplinary
collaborations of scientists in both biological and behavioral
research. We bring together people who tend to use qualitative methods with those who use quantitative methods.

Two special projects
We have two special projects. One is a Latino health
demonstration project, the other a collaborative effort with
the Los Angeles County health department. The Latino
health demonstration project involves participatory research.
The method implemented for this project involves the community from the very beginning, including asking research
questions, seeing what questions are appropriate for the
studies, and disseminating back to the community with
results of the studies. We’ve used this technique with Venice
Family Clinic in designing a study, which now is a collaborative study and is under review for funding. It relates to culturally competent diabetes education. We attempt to show
that nurses from the same Latino background who use certain culturally approADMINISTRATIVE
priate strategies have very effective
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HIV vaccine preparedness
As we all know the HIV/AIDS epidemic continues. The anti-retral-viral
Please turn to page 3
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Physician Assisted Suicide continued…
drugs and the protease inhibitors are not going to curb HIV
worldwide and normal HIV transmission will not be stopped
by behavioral interventions alone. So, as a result, there is an
increasing interest in HIV vaccine. We want to know how to
get involved with HIV vaccine preparedness. Some of the
core leaders of our center have been involved in doing HIV
risk reduction studies for some time. In fact we have had
very favorable outcomes from our studies. Our interventions
have resulted in some improved behaviors and less risky
behaviors. So overall the results of these studies on an individual basis has been recognized to be positive, but we know
that we need to do more. Behavioral interventions alone are
not going to solve the HIV epidemic from particularly a
global perspective. We became interested in vaccines as
another developing approach that needs to be done simultaneously. We began to explore what was happening in vaccine
research, what we realized very quickly was that as the
researchers were moving ahead
with HIV vaccine preparation in
terms of biologic end, the person
end, the behavioral end, was not
being addressed as much. When
we use the term "HIV preparedness", we intend to focus attention upon the issues, ethical and
social, that participants in these
trials might have. We became
involved in a workshop, recognizing that 53 million people
were infected with HIV worldwide, 19 million have already
died, more than 13 million children have been orphaned, and there are 16,000 new cases
every day. Ninety-five percent of these cases are occurring in
developing countries, so it is a global problem that we all
have to address and be concerned about. We decided to do a
vaccine preparedness think tank held August 29, 2001. We
pulled together an interdisciplinary group, which included
researchers from UCLA, community representatives, people
from the county health department, and some pre and postdoctoral fellows. It was purposefully designed to be interdisciplinary and to involve the community so that this would be
a beginning phase for strategic planning in terms of HIV preparedness.
As you are all probably very well aware vaccine trials have
been going on for some time. However it is often said that
ethics and social policy lag behind advances in medical technology. We are trying to address this ethical area related to
HIV vaccine preparedness so as not to lag behind. There is a

lot of concern about HIV preparedness and being in HIV
vaccine trials for many reasons. We must never forget what
happened at Tuskegee and that is a big factor that we need
to keep in mind.
Awareness of this tragic study is widespread in the community and particularly among vulnerable populations and
directly impacts how people respond to us. I know that going
out to the areas where I do my research in East Los Angeles,
and saying that I am from UCLA is not necessarily a big plus
at all, there is a big trust and mistrust issue and so the trust
has to be developed. Tuskegee is one of the most dramatic
examples that I can give you that you need to keep in mind
when you work with people.

Three types of trials
We have three types of trials; phase one, phase two, and
phase three. Currently, we have over 10,000 people who
have been through the various
trials. We know of one large
ongoing trial that is a phase
three involving over 5,000 people. UCLA has a number of trials that they are recruiting
participants for right now. Phase
one trials focus low risk participants and a smaller sample to
test the safety of vaccines.
Whereas phase two trials are
conducted with medium to low
risk participants and they have a
little larger group of participants.
Phase three are efficacy trials
with moderate to high risk patients involving several thousand people. In order to get FDA approval of the vaccine we
really have to have these vaccines go through these three
phases and show that they are safe.

We can “remove the
impediment” to
natural death, but can
take no direct action
to kill, as we see in the
story of Rabbi
Chanina.
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Two types of vaccines
There are two types of vaccines being tested; preventive
vaccines and therapeutic vaccines. Preventive vaccines are
those given to people who are not infected and they either
try to block the HIV from being transmitted or prevent the
organism from developing into the disease. Where as therapeutic vaccines are for HIV infected individuals and they try
to boost the immune system so that people can comeback
from the disease and do better.

Please turn to page 4
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Physician Assisted Suicide continued…
Vulnerable populations and how we define them
We see vulnerable populations as social groups that have
an increased susceptibility or higher than the national risk for
health related problems. While we recognize there are
numerous groups that represent vulnerable populations, we
are focusing on ethnic people of color and low-income people. We also recognize women and children as vulnerable for
populations. Very little research has been done on women
and children, because they don’t necessarily benefit in the
same way that other groups do. Homeless people are vulnerable as well as people exposed to hazardous conditions and
polluted environments such as, some of the migrant farm
workers.

Social concerns of trial participants
As clinical trials are underway we feel a pressing need to
take a closer look at the ethical and social concerns of trial
participants and their communities. We know that many people would be very interested in vaccines if the social and
political climate was fine and the vaccine we possessed was
highly effective. Hopefully, under those conditions, we
wouldn’t have to do very much community preparedness.
However, because this is unlikely in the near future, empirical, focused, cooperative attention by both scientists and the
community at risk is needed.
We know from several qualitative studies that have been
done that there are a number of benefits from participating
in a trial. There is a CDC funded study called Project
LINKS that connects scientists and communities together.
This project surveyed African-Americans from Durham,
South Carolina, injection drug users from Philadelphia, and
gay men and women from San Francisco. Very positive
attributes of the trial were spoken of by the participants, such
as being invited to participate. Injection drug users especially
felt they face risks everyday in their lives taking street drugs.
Now why wouldn’t they become involved in the project? We
feel it makes sense for them to engage in such research.
However, we must comment on the parallel concerns and
issues raised. There are a number of risks and concerns
regarding the vaccines themselves. These include negative
side effects, the unknown safety of these vaccines, development of HIV antibodies, the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS if
an attenuated virus were to be given, restrictions of travel,
inability to join the Peace Corps, inability to donate blood or
organs, inability to receive future vaccines determined to be
most efficacious, and discrimination. For example, injection
drug users also said that their street buddies were more comfortable with the street drugs and had more faith in the street
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drugs than they did in the government. And we hear from
still more injection drug users and gay men and women how
they feel the government has done nothing for more than ten
years and that they believe their population was actually targeted. They feel the government places little or no value on
them as a population group. We would concur that minority
communities have been victimized by the government, visa-vi research abuse, government neglect and social discrimination. Many African-Americans actually believe that the
HIV/AIDS epidemic is a biological experiment that has gone
wrong. That is the type of perspective that we hear all the
time. People from minority communities tend to ask us, "Is
there a reason they are targeting high risk individuals? Is it
perhaps because we’re less sophisticated? Is it because we
don’t ask the difficult questions?"
The social consequences of participation include the
impact of these vaccines with family, friends, life partners,
insurance, and employment. We have heard from individuals
asked to participate in a vaccine trial that they would increase
their risk behavior because they feel a sense of protection
from the vaccine, even though they have no sense of what
the efficacy of the vaccine might be. Often times when
somebody receives the vaccine they will then test sero-posiScientific Truths as Only Truths continued…
ment is obligatory. Therefore, his daughter could not refuse
treatment. Thus consent was not really a central issue.
Needless to say, the doctors were uncomfortable with
this approach. An ethics consultation was requested. The
main question was, “Do we have to tell her that she will be
infertile?”
In one sense, this was an easy case. From a riskmanagement
point of view, it was a “no-brainer.” You tell her and if she
refuses treatment, that’s her choice. It may be tragic but it isn’t
a tort. If you treat her without consent and she sues you later,
it is at least malpractice and may be assault and battery. From
a bioethics perspective, these legal considerations reflected
appropriate moral concerns. Fundamental understandings of
informed consent, respect for persons, and the obligation to tell
the truth all suggested that the patient should be told that she
would be infertile. Not to tell would be paternalistic, and, in
bioethics, there is no greater sin than paternalism, although
that might be hard to explain to her father.
But from another perspective, it seemed a little more complex. Were we really concerned about the patient’s interest or
about the hospital’s? Whenever ethics and risk management
agree, a red flag should go up. Furthermore, legal and moral
principles we were relying on were neither timeless nor universal. If she had not been in the United States, or it had been
Please turn to page 5
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Scientific Truths as Only Truths continued…
twenty-five years earlier, nobody would have told her. She was
a minor. Her parents had the right to make decisions for her.
In addition, her religion did not acknowledge the importance
of autonomy. As her father said, “She must have the treatment. It is required by law. Why add to her suffering now,
when she needs hope and strength.” Clearly, he had her best
interests at heart.
Ethics committee review of the case led to some bitter disagreements about the limits of disclosure, the obligation to tell
the whole truth, the constraints of autonomy in the context of
a religious tradition that did not emphasize or even believe in
autonomy, gender issues, paternalism, multiculturalism and
many other issues. The case clearly touched a lot of raw nerves.
No consensus was reached. However, most people thought
that the girl ought to be told, and that is what the attending
physician decided to do.
At a family conference, he told the girl and her parents that
treatment was her only hope for survival and that it would definitely leave her infertile. He told her that without the treatment she would certainly die.
The discussion was heart-rending. The girl and her parents were
clearly grasping for straws of
hope. They asked about whether
she could donate eggs, about
uterus transplants, about gene
transfer techniques, about
cloning. The doctor was steadfast
in sticking to the facts as he saw
them and in refusing to offer false hope. He told her that she
could not donate eggs, that there was no chance now or in the
future that she could have a uterus transplant, and that without
a uterus there was no way to become pregnant or to have a
child. These were all true statements. Brutally, unimaginatively true.
After hearing all this information, the girl ran crying from the
room and refused to consent to the surgery or to any other treatment for her cancer. A few days later, however, she returned.
She signed the consent form without reading it. It was a baffling reversal.
Further investigation by the social worker revealed that, in
the interim, she had talked to her rabbi. He had assured her
that there were limits to what the doctors could know or do. If
God wanted her to become pregnant, her rabbi told her, she
would become pregnant. Perhaps this reassurance helped.
Perhaps she reconsidered her decision for other reasons.
Perhaps there was pressure from her family. We don’t know
exactly what happened. But she changed her mind, signed the
form, and underwent surgery, radiation treatment and

chemotherapy. She responded well to treatment and returned
home. We later learned that she had married and she and her
husband had adopted two children.
The case raises a number of interesting issues, but the one
I would like to focus on is the difference between the rabbinical and the medical approach to truth-telling and informed consent. Specifically, I would like to think about whether it would
have been dishonest or misleading for the doctor to have said
what the rabbi said, namely, that even after a hysterectomy, it
would be possible to have children if God wanted her to have
children. Put another way, are scientific facts the only valid
facts for scientists and may nonscientists choose a different set
of facts? Or are the truths of science universal truths, so unwillingness to believe them constitutes self-delusion, and propagating them constitutes virtue? It seems as if what the doctor
told the girl and what the Rabbi said cannot both be true, that
is, it can't be true. But which truth should the doctors affirm?
Doctor as Materialistisic Scientist
There are a couple of ways to think about the doctor’s role
and responsibility in such a case. One is to imagine a doctor
who does not believe in God and
is not at all religious. We might
think of such a doctor as a thoroughgoing materialist and scientist. She would believe that the
only truths in the world are those
that have been tested by experiment or clinical trial. Such a doctor would think of religion and
religious beliefs as mere fairy
tales, or worse, as dangerous hypocrisy left over from an unenlightened age. For such a doctor, the question of whether a
woman without a uterus could ever bear children is an empirical question. The answer is straightforward. It is clearly impossible. Thus, it would be immoral and unethical to suggest that
it might be possible, and it would be irrational to invoke a mystical, transcendental concept such as God as a mechanism for
the impossible.
Such a doctor has a faith in the truths of science and the limitations of the material world that is as deep and abiding as the
faith of any mystic in the truths of religion or existence of a transcendent spiritual world. For such a physician, I would argue, a
statement about what God might do would not just be a lie but
would be a fundamental betrayal her own deepest held beliefs.
She would be dishonest to both the patient and, perhaps more
importantly, to herself. She would have a moral obligation to
behave as the doctor in our hospital behaved.
However, and this is crucial, that obligation would not have
derived from a general moral theory of truth telling so much as
Please turn to page 6

Whenever ethics and
risk management agree,
a red flag should go up.

Update Volume 17, Number 1

5

Scientific Truths as Only Truths continued…
it would have derived from a more personal set of beliefs about
what constitutes the truth. The doctor would have a moral
obligation to herself tell the truth as she saw it or believed it.
Doctor as Compassionate Consequentialist
Another situation would be where the doctor was not
such a deep believer in science but was not particularly religious either. For such a doctor, the mysteries of science and
the mysteries of religion would seem to be equally arcane
and unapproachable, perhaps even beyond understanding.
Such doctors might recognize and even admire true scientists and true religious believers, but would not consider
themselves to be either. (This group might comprise the
majority of doctors today.)
For this doctor, either a statement that the woman could
never have a baby or that God might allow her to become
pregnant after a hysterectomy would both be tentative, and
thus both would be possible. Such a doctor just wouldn’t
know for sure.
Such a doctor, presumably, would be less committed to any
particular idea of truth than to an ideal of compassion.
Compassion is certainly a central element of what we expect
from our doctors. It is sometimes difficult to determine exactly
what compassion demands. By an appeal to compassion, we
could argue that it would be okay to say anything that would
make our patients feel better, even lies. Some might argue,
however, that in the end, telling the truth is the most compassionate response, and that a lie up front will not only make the
truth hurt more later, but will destroy the future possibility of a
trusting relationship, and thus destroy the possibility of compassion down the road.
This is a traditional dilemma for doctors. For centuries, doctors have claimed the right to withhold difficult truths in order
to make patients feel better, to engender hope, not destroy
their will to live. The sentiment behind such arguments is that
doctors have as their single goal the best possible outcome for
the patient and in pursuit of that goal, moral transgressions
such as little lies are not only acceptable but obligatory.
Alternatively, such a doctor might argue that, in the long run,
patients do best when they are told the truth. Telling patients
lies destroys the trust that is the essence of the doctor-patient
relationship. The patient will no longer believe anything the
doctor says, and so, her future care will suffer. Honesty about
outcomes is important because a trusting relationship between
doctor and patient is important. Thus, the argument might go,
even from a consequentialist position, we are better off telling
the truth.
The consequentialist argument can lead in either direction
but, interestingly, it does not rely on a belief in any particular
form or structure of truth. In essence, the truth is what works.
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The doctors’ allegiance ought to be to whatever will lead to the
best outcome. Sometimes that may be science and its truths,
sometimes it may be religion and its truths, and sometimes
they are in harmony and a choice might not have to be made.
Such a doctor might learn from the rabbi in this case, and
adopt a faith-based approach as just one of the tools in his
conversational armamentarium. Thus, whenever he feels a
patient needs hope, he might say, “Well, all the studies show
that your cancer is untreatable, but if God wants it to be
cured, it’ll be cured.”
Such a doctor raises the question of whether doctors should
be guided by allegiance to any form of truth or belief or
whether, instead, they should be guided by some other sort of
moral obligation and see truth as necessarily malleable, but the
duty of compassion as absolute.
Doctor as Religious Believer
What about the doctor who believes deeply in God and in
miracles? Could such a doctor speak as the rabbi spoke? Would
it have been acceptable for such a doctor to say, as the rabbi
said, that if God wants a girl without a uterus to have children,
she will have children?
It seems that such a doctor might be in a position that is
analogous, in many ways, to that of the first doctor, the scientist. That is, he not only could say this, but he must say it. Not
to believe this would betray his own most deeply held personal beliefs.
But a different sort of problem arises for such a believer. At
some level, absolute faith in God to perform miracles that go
beyond science becomes incompatible with medical care. If
one’s faith was so deep that one thought of all disease and healing as under God’s control, then the whole enterprise of scientific research, medical care, and therapeutics, would seem a bit
absurd. What, after all, are we trying to prove by developing
treatments to interfere with or modify God’s will? It seems that
even the most deeply religious physician must believe to a certain extent in the laws and truths of science, and must be able
or willing to say that something is scientifically impossible.
Perhaps only a rabbi, that is, only a nonphysician, could stand
outside the world view of medicine and science to a sufficient
degree see all the ravages of disease and works of the physicians as occurring on a different level than God’s work.
This view necessitates a philosophic split between the
technical work and truths of medicine on one hand, and the
spiritual work and truths of a different sort on the other.
Medicine becomes a mundane and decidedly value-free,
despiritualized activity. It also raises the question of whether
the morality of the physician comes from a sort of professional
morality, a set of role-specific duties and obligations or, by
contrast, whether the physician ought to be so value-neutral
Please turn to page 7
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that whatever values he incorporates into his practice must be
imported from the outside?
Religion, Truth-telling, and Internal Morality
The conflict between an internal ethic of the profession and
an external ethic for the profession energizes one of the more
interesting debates in the field of bioethics. Stated simply, the
question is whether medicine is primarily and intrinsically a
moral enterprise, with its own internal values and norms, or
whether it is primarily a technical and scientific enterprise
which is morally neutral until society, culture, or individual
patients bring values that imbue it with moral purpose.
Leon Kass, in a series of remarkable and deeply insightful
essays, argues strongly that medicine is essentially a moral
enterprise.1 He elucidates the continuing relevance of the
Hippocratic oath and other ancient Greek ideas about the
nature of health and disease and about the virtues and the ends
of the medical profession. Those ideas, he believes, still define
the core morality of the profession. Today’s problems, in Kass’
view, derive from an inattention
to these values, and today’s solutions can come only from a return
to them.
Edmund Pellegrino also
argues for a return to and a
reasserting of Hippocratic ideals.
Medical ethics, he writes, “is not
a matter of social convenience,
alterable by political social or economic exigency or by public referendum. Any ethic changeable
by fortuitous social, economic, political or legal fiat ultimately
ceases to be a viable ethic.”2 Like Kass, he calls for a return to
and rearticulation of ancient moral values as the only hope for
saving the medical profession from what amounts to a hostile
moral takeover.
By contrast, many bioethicists feel that medicine is a technical, rather than a moral enterprise. In this view, doctors’
expertise is as morally neutral as that of electricians’ or auto
mechanics’ and the Hippocratic oath is a narrow, sectarian, and
elitist code that represents only the particular values of a particular group of physicians. Some doctors or patients might
choose these values but there is nothing universal about them.
For a doctor to claim any moral authority is, according to
Robert Veatch, a serious fallacy which he calls the “generalization of expertise.” Doctors’ expertise, he argues, is strictly technical, not moral, and the ends to which it is put are strictly
moral, not technical. Therefore, doctors ought not to speak
about ends. In an article Veatch wrote with Spicer, for example,

they condemn professionals who “persist in believing that they
can determine, based on objective knowledge and their medical skill, what will benefit a patient and what will not.” Such
judgments, they think, require the incorporation of values, and
“clinicians cannot claim expertise in value judgments.”3
Similarly, Troyen Brennen discusses what he calls “just doctoring” and calls for a balance between a traditional medical
morality, in which the physician would do everything possible
that might benefit his or her individual patient, and the
demands of modern liberalism, which require the physician to
consider and incorporate society’s economic and institutional
concerns.4 Brennen remains sympathetic to the physician but
like many other philosophers, economists, and policy makers,
sees that the doctor’s traditional moral commitment to do
everything for each patient presents society with an infinitely
large and ultimately unpayable bill for services. Such economic
tensions, like the moral tensions articulated by Veatch and
Spicer, lead inexorably toward external controls on the content
of medical practice.
There seems to be a wide gap
between those like Kass and
Pellegrino who believe that medicine should be rooted in the
internal values of the profession,
and those like Veatch and
Brennen who see medicine as
necessarily embedded in and
accountable to a particular political society. Nevertheless, there is
a common thread in all of their
arguments. All see the current situation in health care as an unsatisfactory compromise of moral norms. For Kass and Pellegrino,
it is a compromise of the Hippocratic norms which they see as
central. For Veatch and Brennen, it is a compromise of the
political values that govern all aspects of our society and which
should clearly govern medicine. Each of these thinkers calls for
an explicit articulation of a political and moral program which
would be different from today’s melioristic status quo.
We seem to want it both ways. We want to think that there
is something inherently and intrinsically moral about the profession, that there are certain things doctors should or must do
because they are doctors. We like the idea of a profession with
its own internal moral code that dictates responses to moral
dilemmas. This view offers us some reassurance about what
doctors will or will not do. But lately, it seems, we don’t want
doctors paternalistically imposing their values on others. We
want to think that the patients’ values should drive decisions
and that doctors need to curtail their own morality. Informed
Please turn to page 8

Specifically, it becomes
faith in our doctor’s
ability to distinguish
facts from values,
reality from hypothesis,
knowledge from bias.
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Scientific Truths as Only Truths continued…
consent, shared decision making, the growth of modern biomedical ethics, health law, and manifold regulatory controls on
doctors all bespeak a rampant distrust of doctors as individuals
and as a profession. By this view, we want doctors to be valuefree technicians, offering their services to individuals, insurance
pools, and the country as a whole, but in ways that are guided
and determined by the policies of ethics committees, legally
determined standards of care, or democratically determined
allocation plans or practice guidelines. We want it both ways.
In a curious way, the rise of bioethics necessarily contributes
to the gradual but inexorable demoralization of the medical
profession. Nonpaternalistic doctors who do not have or impose
their own values on clinical situations are, in essence, amoral
technicians. They should defer to somebody else–patients,
philosophers, clergy, or democratic populace speaking through
referenda–to supply the values.
The irony of this view is that medicine that is narrowly
self-contained in this way and does not rely on any particular
philosophy or value system becomes, in itself, a type of faith.
Specifically, it becomes faith in our doctor’s ability to distinguish facts from values, reality from hypothesis, knowledge
from bias. We need to imagine that there is and can be such
a thing as a value-free doctor at the center. Anyone who
believes in this mythical construction, in spite of a century of
anthropologic, sociologic, and cultural criticism that shows
how inevitably embedded we all are in the world views of
our particular culture, must be as passionate in his beliefs as
any mystic.
To return, then, to the case I started with, we might ask
whether the doctor was really giving the patient “the facts” or
whether, instead, each fact was a decision, a judgment, a
prophecy. Why not imagine that someday a uterus transplant
might be possible, or human reproduction by cloning? Why not
imagine that we will discover ways to bring about the regeneration of organs? How do we know what is or is not possible, or
will or will not be possible? The true scientist could never talk
dogmatically and self-assuredly to a patient about what the
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future will bring.
We live in an age of uncertainty. In medicine, we know
more about disease and treatment, and about the relief of suffering, than doctors have ever known. We can erase pain with
an intravenous solution, ease the ache of depression or anxiety.
We manipulate consciousness, emotion, and memory. We also
know, or should know, how little we know, how inadequate we
are to the scientific and moral challenges we face. How should
we live? What does it mean to care for one another? How best
to share another’s grief, to help carry another’s burdens? These
are the big questions, and we are no closer to answers than we
were a thousand years ago, when there were plenty of doctors
but no penicillin, open heart surgery, or bioethics.
Perhaps the only way we can learn what to say and do is by
putting ourselves into situations where we and our beliefs are
tested. I sat in the room with that 17-year-old who was watching her hopes and dreams vanish before an onslaught of information delivered dispassionately and idealistically by a zealous
modern doctor. And I heard a rabbi meet her in her fears and
speak to her longings. I realized that I wanted to live more like
the rabbi. It seems apparent that, in order to do so, honestly, I
may need to learn how to believe more deeply in a God powerful enough to give such a woman children. It would not be
enough to speak the Rabbi’s words. That would be offering
only glib reassurances. Instead, I would need to learn a different way of thinking and responding in the world. I would need
that in order to keep sitting in such rooms, to keep engaging
my patients in the terrible conversations I must engage in, to
maintain some sense of my own purpose. This is to say, I may
need more faith in order to keep practicing medicine. ■
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